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TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM
STUDY OF THE NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION'S SOUTH POLE STATION
AS AN ANALOGOUS DATA BASE FOR THE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT
OF A MOON LABORATORY
I. _TRODUCTION
The day will come when the United States will want to return to the Earth's Moon. That
requirement will be based on one of the following perceived needs:
- Science
- International cooperation
- Energy development (helium 3, solar collectors)
- Geologic development (titanium, other)
- Exploration
- Nationalistic impetus (another space race?)
- Off-Earth pilot habitats (to learn how to live off-Earth)
- Groupings of the above.
When one of these perceived needs becomes great enough, the United States and NASA will
look to the Apollo program for technical and inspirational guidance. But Apollo was designed to be an
end to itself--the landing of a man on the Moon and his return safely within the decade of the 1960's.
When that was accomplished, the program folded because it was not self-sustaining. The next time
we return to the Moon, the true inspiration we should look for is something very similar to our
operations in the Antarctic as an applicable historical analog.
The fact that there is no compelling reason to return to the Moon today is no assurance that
such will not be the case very quickly tomorrow. In fact, for those who study the historical cycles of
exploration and science, there is a sense of inevitability that, regardless of the costs or the politics or
other extenuating circumstances, eventually the country that has dominated this century in science
and industry will wish to explore and build space-based communities. One basic concept to begin
this effort is an economical return to the Moon for the purpose of utilizing it scientifically and
developing it commercially. This return will be driven primarily by the relatively easy access of the
Moon (as compared to Mars and other planets of the solar system) and the gradual recognition that
it is a resource that the Earth cannot and should not ignore forever. The return may be in the form of
an international expedition, but probably the emphasis from the United States will be on two parallel
tracks that will eventually merge--science and industrial development.
In order to learn themost aboutthe Moon andexploit its uniqueenvironment,scientistsand
engineerswill haveto spendweeks,evenmonths,on thelunar surface.To accomplishthat, anout-
postwill haveto beestablished.But whatkind of outpost?To gain insighton the likely scenarioof a
lunar outpost,the history of theexplorationof the Antarcticcontinentandspecifically the attemptsto
reachthegeographicalSouthPolemay serveasa harbingerof thefuture.
The first expeditions to the South Pole in the late 19th and early 20th century were essen-
tially sprints and publicity stunts, primarily accomplished for national prestige and personal glory,
although often wrapped in the dubious veneer of science. These sprints were accomplished with the
technology of the day--steamships to the ice shelf followed by the use of dogs and manpower to
make a torturous journey to the pole and return. Many men died and many more suffered from frost-
bite, hunger, and exhaustion. Roald Amundsen, a Norwegian, reached the Pole first on December 14,
1911, followed quickly by his competitor, Englishman Robert Scott (who died with his entire team on
the trip back). After these highly adventurous and publicity-conscious "firsts" had been accom-
plished, however, interest waned in duplicating the feats. It was far too expensive in money and
human life to do something that had already been done. The South Pole as a destination was aban-
doned. These sprints might be seen as roughly equivalent to our Apollo Program which was based
as much on Cold War politics as it was on science or even exploration. Just as the initial conquering
of the South Pole, the Moon was abandoned as too expensive for the likely gain. Nevertheless, we
are back at the South Pole and, similarly, we will return to the Moon and probably because of the
same reason: new technology will make it much easier.
Four decades after the initial nationalistic South Pole sprints, technology had changed suffi-
ciently that the South Pole became a goal once more. Rather than a desperate expedition, the next
group to arrive at the South Pole were Americans who simply flew there in an airplane. They landed
on October 31, 1956, and construction of a South Pole statio n began a month later. The chronology of
the attainment of the South Pole, sprints pushing the available technology to the limit, followed by a
long respite, and then a return using advanced technology and the construction of a permanent base,
might be the chronology that lunar development will also follow.
It is the thrust of this report that the South Pole Station of the National Science Foundation
(NSF) can be used to develop an analog for the construction, funding, and logistical support of a
Moon base.
II. THE NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION'S AMUNDSEN-SCOTT SOUTH POLE
STATION AS LUNAR BASE ANALOG
Clearly, the NSF's South Pole Station at least :looks like a lunar science station might look.
The central area of the station is located beneath an aluminum geodesic dome. The dome houses
three two-story structures which contain living, dining, communications, recreation, laboratory facili-
ties, and conference rooms. The station can accommodate a crew of 24 during the winter period
(when the station is completely cut off from the outside), and a crew of up to 40 during the summer,
with another 60 people in the emergency facility called Summer Camp. A series of steel arches run
perpendicular to the axis of the dome's main entryway and houses a garage complex, gymnasium,
carpentry shop, power plant, biomedical facility, and main fuel storage. The fuel arch contains nine
25,000-gal biadders, giving the station a maximum Capacity of 950,000 L or 225,000 gal of diesel
L
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fuel, arctic DF-A. The four-storyskylaband theballooninflation toweradjoin the main stationand
areaccessiblethroughcoveredarchways.The clearair facility for atmosphericchemistrylies 100-m
upwind of the station.Otherresearchmodulesarelocatedat variousdistancesfrom the station.
Primary stationpower is providedby oneof three350-kWgenerators.Wasteheat is utilized
for stationheatingvia a glycol circulation systemthat conductstheheatedcoolant throughthe vari-
ousstation structures.Another glycol loop suppliesheatto the snowmelter for the station'swater
supply. Thesesystems,aswell aswater, sewage,phone,computer,and electric lines, are routed
througha seriesof undergroundsteelutility corridors,termedutilidors.The SouthPoleStation is
supportedand managedby a contractor.TheUnited StatesNavy and Air Forcesuppliestransporta-
tion and other logistical needs.All supportgroupswork undercontractto the NSF.
By this description,it is clear that theSouthPole Stationsatisfiesmost of thecriteria of the
lunarbaseanalog.It is remote,difficult to get to, requiresexternalresupply,and mustbe self-suffi-
cientduring long periodsfor powerandpersonnelsupport.
HI. THE EVOLVING CONSTRUCTION ANALOG
The Amundsen-Scott Antarctic base (South Pole Station) was constructed in stages, each
summer season allowing more construction and more capability to be added to the base. At first, the
base was only available for short visits. Gradually, enough infrastructure was built to allow winter-
ing-over and permanent habitation. Initial design and construction of the station did not guarantee
this would occur but it did allow iterative growth. If it was seen to be valuable, additional capacity
was allowed. Gradually, the present capability was attained, not as a great and expensive goal, but
simply as evolutionary. The construction of a lunar station should be similar. This might avoid great
debates as to cost and function. Initial goals should be small. A step-by-step approach will give us a
lunar base without the pain of the inevitable reassessments huge programs and complex goals
attract. A plan for the evolutionary construction of a lunar station using as much as possible already
paid-for designs is presented in appendix A.
IV. THE FUNDING ANALOG
Just as construction, funding for a lunar base can use the South Pole Station analog. Funding
should be spread over a period of time and should be a level requirement each fiscal year. A lunar
base could very well mean a tremendous boost to the American economy, adding much more than
it takes, but it should not be sold as such since it is by no means guaranteed. The lunar station
should be an economical one, logically spread out over a period of time, using as much of the existing
space transportation infrastructure as possible. A funding plan for the lunar base is presented in
appendix B.
V. THE TRANSPORTATION ANALOG
The NSF used available transportation to transport construction materials, supplies, and per-
sonnel to build its Antarctic base. The United States Navy and the Air Force, for the most part, are
the agencies that supply that transportation. There is, however, no similar agency that has the
transportation required to carry the construction materials, supplies, and personnel to the Moon. The
entity that builds the Iunar base, then, must supply its own transportation t0 the Moon, or some
other entity has to be created to provide that transportation. It is suggested that a government-
regulated utility is the best method to create this transportation system. When estimating the costs
of the lunar base, transportation is by far the major factor. The lunar transit utility (LTU) will be
charged to keep those costs to a minimum and definitely not to exceed the annual budget. The pro-
posed organization of the LTU along with the Space transportation systems and manifest required is
shown in appendix C. Although it is presented as a way to get to the Moon based on present
technology, it should be recognized that this is the weakest of the links in Moon base development.
A transportation revolution would be very helpful.
VL mE LOGISTICS ANALOG
The use of a logistical data base from the NSF South Pole Station would be very helpful in
determining the resupply requirements for a lunar base. That was the first goal of the principal ....
investigators of this Center Director's DiScretionary Fund (CDDF) project. Several_teleconferences
were conducted with NSF personnel to develop the requirements. Also, much research was done in
logistical manuals already in existence such as the United States Army's Engineer Field Data (FM
5-34). The use of the data found in that manual and applied to _i lunar station is presented in
appendix D. When it was clear that the NSF and the United States Navy had not kept records on
either the construction materials used for the South Pole Station, or records on materiel logisticsi, or
sociological data in a systematic way, i twas eVident that tWO phases 6fresearch wouid be required,
The first phase would be to interview NSF and navy personnel and gather information through a
questionnaire. The second phase would then be to conduct further research using whatever raw data
existed. Accordingly, a questionnaire for the NSF was developed and is included in appendix E.
After investigation, it was discovered that raw data were available on the station, located in the
National Archives. National Archives researchers were contacted, and a list of South Pole Station
data was obtained. This is included in appendix F.
VH. THE NATIONAL PROGRAM AND INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION ANALOG
The _tarctic analog is also interesting to study in terms of international cooperation as well
as nationalistic tendencies. The recent history of the exploration and scientific investigation of the
Antarctic continent shows that there are many examples of both international cooperation as well as
nationalistic displays. At present, all the stations in Anarctica are constructed and maintained by
individual nations who have, in effect, carved out areas of dominance. Argentina, for example, has
4
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even made some territorial claims, going so far as to bring immigrants to their sites for home-
steading. Such a mix, based on treaty and nationalistic needs, might also be expected on the Moon.
Based on this analog, it should not be expected that international lunar bases will be the rule.
VHI. THE SPACE EXPLORATION INITIATIVE AND ITS DEMISE
While this CDDF initiative was beginning to gain focus and momentum, another NASA pro-
gram was also beginning to form. This was President Bush's Space Exploration Initiative (SEI).
One of the methodologies of that effort was to utilize Earth-based resources to determine the
requirements for lunar and Mars bases. It was inevitable that SEI would eventually want to look at
the NSF's South Pole Station. That was exactly what occurred in early 1991. Johnson Space Center
was given primary responsibility to conduct research with the NSF on the use of Antarctic bases as
analogs for future NASA bases. At that time, NSF personnel no longer were allowed to work with
the principle investigators of this CDDF initiative. Since that time, however, SEI has been canceled.
Nevertheless, NASA headquarters continues an effort, and this report will be forwarded there to
offer the information gained in our study.
IX. SUMMARY
The planning accomplished and set forth in this report reflects the use of the South Pole
Station as an analog for a lunar base. Using the success of the South Pole Station as a foundation,
any designer of a lunar station can proceed in confidence. It is also very clear that the NSF and
NASA should work closely on any lunar base to provide it with the important knowledge and experi-
ence each agency holds.
5
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APPENDIX A
THE EVOLVING CONSTRUCTION ANALOG
Much of NASA's past history has led the agency in the direction of a "single launch" strat-
egy whereby everything required for a mission was sent into space on a single carder and essen-
tially ready to be operated. Examples include Apollo, Skylab, and Spacelab. The primary reason for
this is obvious: the hardest and most expensive part of the job is boosting the hardware into space
so a single launch is attractive from a pure cost standpoint. Construction in space is also an un-
known. Depending on the requirements, it can be expected that construction in space will be poten-
tially difficult, expensive, unsafe, and unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the complex nature of a lunar base
will probably require that it be built in stages. But what will those stages be? The historical analog of
the construction of the South Pole Station is applicable. The lunar base will have many components
but it can become operational with just a few of them at the beginning (some small habitats, fuel
cells or solar power, etc.). Additional construction over many years can then create the fully
functioning base.
It is the proposal of this report that our fin'st lunar base be built using Space Station Freedom
(S.S. Freedom) designs as the basis for the habitat modules, the laboratory modules, and airlocks.
The design of those modules has been completed through a critical design review (CDR), and could
be constructed for primarily the cost of the hardware, rather than going through a new and expensive
design process. Table A-1 lists the elements of each part of the lunar station, the quantity required
of each, and the weight. The latter is critical, of course, in transporting the modules and supporting
hardware to the Moon. From this table, it can be seen that a total of over 500 tons would need to be
lifted to the lunar surface. However, to use the Antarctic analog, this effort need not be accomplished
with a few launches. In fact, this paper recommends that the construction of the First lunar base occur
over a 22-year period. The pacing of this program will be based on both weight hauled and costs.
Since it is likely that costs will be the limiting factor, the launch and construction schedule recom-
mended by this paper will be shown in appendix B, which discusses the funding analog.
Figure A-1 is illustrative of the methodology of using space station modules on the lunar sur-
face. This paper recommends that a space station module be attached to a strongback that contains
the retrorocket for landing on the lunar surface. That strongback would also have Apollo lunar rover-
type wire wheels and leveling legs. Astronauts on the surface (or remote control from the ground)
would guide the lab module into place and then use the leveling legs to situate it in the proper place.
The strongback would then become the foundation for the module. It is suggested that the first move-
ment and joining of modules should be handled manually followed by more sophistication over the
quarter-century of construction perhaps gradually evolving into construction by remote control.
Figure A-2 shows the simple lunar station regolith mesh holder for solar storms and micro-
meteoroid protection. This lightweight mesh is wrapped around the module using four posts put into
place by astronauts. Shaped charges at the bottom of the posts blasts the necessary hole to hold the
posts. Figure A-3 shows an end view of a Freedom module in place with the storm fence in place
plus a regolith fill around it. To avoid a cave-like interior with no view of the outside, it is suggested
that conference rooms and most offices be provided with viewing windows without regolith cover.
Figure A-4 shows the recommended layout of the completed lunar station. The module
descriptions are self-explanatory. The components not already designed would include the oxygen
pI_Ca_NIK PAGE BLANK NOT FtLNIED
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plant, the fuel cell module, the solar power grid, and the observatory. All other designs should be
able to come off the shelf from space station. Figure A-5 shows the layout of the NSF South Pole
Station for comparison. The layout of this lunar station is such that it can be built in stages in the
order as shown in appendix B. Essentially, the work will begin with infrastructure (power and utili-
ties, regolith loader, airlocks) and then a laboratory module followed by living quarters. Everything is
approached in a gradual build-up, each phase based on what has already come before, paralleling the
Antarctic experience.
Table A-1. Lunar base construction requirements.
(Note: Estimated weights based on current S.S. Freedom designs)
Element
Hab Module/Storm Shelter
Lab Module
Airlocks
,,,,.n, ,, ,
Main Entrance
Greenhouses
Solar Power Grid
ii
Vehicle Hangar
Airbanks
Pressurized Passageways
Substation
Dining/Bar Facility
Biomed Facility
Bathroom/Shower Module
Utility Rooms
Exercise Facility
Fuel Cell Module
Maintenance Facility
Observatory
Conference Room/Office
Quantity
1
Weight
(kg)
19,000
1
Total Weight
(kg)
19,000
3 22,000 66,000
..it, m, i,
10 4,000 40,000
, '''7
9,000
18,000
20,000
4,000
,,.,, .., .,,,,
20,000
2,000
8,000
19,000
6
9,000
36,000
20,000
4,000
20,000
6,000
8,000
19,000
22,00022,000
1 19,000 19,000
2 8,000 16,000
7,000
10,000
19,000
7,000
10,000
19,000
22,00022,000
1 19,000 19,000
Suit Room 1 16,000 16,000
Secondary Suit Room 1 8,000 8,000
Library 1 7,000 7,000
Miscellaneous Cables, Ducts, 1 30,000 30,000
Airlines
2 2,000 4,000
446,000
Front-End Loader(s)
TOTAL
8
7-
HABITATION/LABORATORY MODULES
SPACE STATION FREEDOM DESIGN Snap-on Connectors
/ _ fo_slmplified conslruction
_..ICkL--__ ..-_.'-_ I-'_1 a_Fo=_a,on,_I /
_:w_-_ )1_ )-1, _ J XJ / J
Apollo-style wire wheels with engine with G&C SPACE STATION
electric motor on each FREEDOM DESIGN
wheel
AIRLOCKS -
SPACE STATON FREEDOM
DESIGN
Figure A-1. S.S. Freedom modules and landing strongbacks for the lunar base.
RegolJth Mesh
Underground
Figure A-2. Simple lunar station regolith mesh holder for module solar storm
and micrometeoroid protection.
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Regolith Fill
Station Module
Storm Fence
Strongback andRetr
exhaust Retro-rocket package
nozzle
Module
leveler Wire wheels
End View- Station Module
Figure A-3. Solar storm and meteoroid protective cover the NASA/NSF lunar base.
Suit Room '_,_{_-- Ent,ance i l 1 i I 1 1 11
• Airlock I [ l l J 1 l I I
I " " " [I II1 11
': Sol_'i I i I 1 ! I II
_.Observatory Bathroom/____.lb- : I-'ower_ I I I I ! i ilShowe, : IIIIitll
, ......
Library -.'Iv Facilities ] : .. 1 I ! I I II
I i . _ ::: IIILIII
J J I J "_ ._ _" "_ I I I I I I I
/ .........
- Storm Shelter _,
Dining/l_ J :i:;:;
Facility !ii!!i
X.
Exercise J
FacilitYPres_urize d
P_ag"waY/iGreenhouses N
Courtyard
"-'Utility Room 2
Facility
dCWater Une
Conference
"q'-,-- Main Entry
Double AirlocksMaintenance
Facility Room
Figure A-4. Lunar station inspired by the NSF South Pole analog.
Carpenter
Garage Shop Gym Power Plant Bio-Med Facility Fuel Storage
/Balloon
Inflation
Tower
Air Plenum
Room
Hydrogen
Generation
And Cargo
Dining/Bal
Emergency
Escape
Hatch
l-Commissary/Library
_vered Passageways
ht Room
Gravity Vault
rech Shop
,Annex
shack
PROTECTIVE DOME
dPersonnel Quarters
Figure A-5. The NSF South Pole Station.
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APPENDIX B
THE FUNDING ANALOG
The approach by NASA to funding a "new start" program throughout the post-Apollo years
is to campaign within the agency for a program and then, after convincing the NASA administrator of
the worth of the mission, to attempt to fund it through Congress. The funding effort with Congress
can be very simple--listing it in a request for fiscal year funding and letting it stay or be cut without
much comment---or it can be a complex, nearly military campaign where space supporters are ener-
gized to lobby for the program with both the President and the Congress. This approach causes
battle lines to be drawn with friends and foes battling year after year over the project.
For the lunar base, it is suggested that an alternative to that approach be made. First, the
program should be designed to work within the American method of funding, the annual fiscal year.
No more than $3 billion should be spent annually in constant dollars based on the first fiscal year the
program begins. This incremental and steady approach should allow it to become less and less con-
troversial over the 22-year construction period.
Next, only $1.5 billion of this funding per year should come from the Federal Government. The
remainder should come from a wide consortium of industrial and scientific organizations and if such
funding cannot be gained, then nothing should be accomplished that year. The prospecting for
minerals (titanium, etc.) and energy resources (helium-3) should interest companies in those
arenas. Universities, pharmaceutical companies, and a variety of research companies should be
interested in the lab facilities on the Moon. Of course, the development of Moon-based observa-
tories should excite the interest of many scientific organizations. The entertainment industry should
also not be neglected. The lunar base could certainly receive tourists at a later stage in its develop-
ment and, before that, special guests, including film crews for advertising, and even feature films.
Special celebrations could also be held on the Moon. Managers of the lunar base should be aggres-
sive in gaining the necessary funding. In fact, their jobs will depend on it.
The program's life should not be managed by NASA alone, but by a consortium of govern-
mental and industrial partners. International governments may be welcome within the consortium,
but it is suggested that it would be less expensive, and with more certain return of the funds spent,
to make the consortium as national as possible. This follows the Antarctic experience. International
cooperation is certainly a goal, but to date it has not proved to be a very cost-effective way to man-
age a program. The simplification that comes with a more national approach where the goals are
clear is worth more than any international funding and the complex web that then occurs as several
governments enter into tangled agreements.
The consortium, which might be called the Lunar Base Consortium (LBC) should have the
clear goal of ultimately becoming a profit-making organization and could, within time, be allowed to
become a legal United States corporation with all the rights and responsibilities of such. Although
this has not been the Antarctic experience, the availability of minerals and energy resources from the
lunar surface certainly indicates that the development of the Moon can depart in this one area from
the Antarctic analog.
Table B-1 lists the facility and equipment costs and the quantities required for the completed
base. Table B-2 illustrates a suggested cost outlay over the 22 years of build-up. This table also
PI_C:IKHNG PAGE BLANK NOT FILf_ID
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Table B-1. Lunar base modular cost requirements.
(Note: Estimated costs based on space station and known launch designs.)
Hab Module
Lab Module
Airlocks
Main Entrance
Greenhouses
Solar Power Grid
Vehicle Hangar
Airbanks
Element
Pressurized Passageways
Substation
_ar Facility
Library
Biomed Facility
Bathroom/Shower Module
Utility Rooms
Exercise Facility
Fuel Cell Module
Maintenance Facility 1
_Observatory
Conference Room/Office
Suit Room
Secondary Suit Room
Miscellaneous Cables, Ducts, Airlines
Quanti_ .....
1
3
10
2
6
1
8o
Unit Cost
($M)
4O
70
14
10
10
20O
10
4O
6
24
44
16
8O
2O
3O
16
2O0
80
500
36
50
4O
Total Cost
($M)
4O
210
140
10
2O
200
10
40
36
24
44
16
8O
2O
60
16
200
80
500
36
5O
40
1 200 200
Front-end Loaders 2 25 50
MODULAR SUB-TOTAL $2,122
5OO
40O
13 6,500Strongbacks/Landers (Heavy)
Strongbacks/Landers (Medium)
Strongbacks/Landers (Light)
LANDER SUB-TOTAL
TOTAL
8 3,200
14 350 4,900
$14,600
$16,722
lists the elements that would be launched to the lunar surface during each fiscal year. These set of
launches are referred to as "modules." It is recommended that each module be managed by a module
manager, with all responsibility to see that the module is constructed and launched within the
budget. It should be a particular goal of the LBC to get more and more efficient in terms of adminis-
tration and overhead. Module managers would be encouraged in this since the more administration
and overhead, the less he or she has to spend on construction and launching. Efficiencies should,
therefore, occur as a matter of course. Note that table B-2 also lists the launcher recommended to be
used. This is further explained in appendix C, the transportation analog. Table B-3 accounts for the
total cost of the program over the 22-year period.
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Table B-2. Lunar base pacing.
Note: It will be a goal of the program to spend no more than 3 billion FY93 constant dollars per
year during the 22-year build-up of the lunar station. The exception to this are the three manned
launches during that period. These will be costed at $6 billion each. It is expected, however, that
this cost may be decreased as the program goes on due to efficiencies that may occur during an
operational program. One billion dollars (or slightly less to compensate for a heavy launch year) for
administration, overhead, and other services will be assumed per year.
Module 1 - FYO1
ELEMENT
Solar Grid
Power Substation
LAUNCHER COSTS ($M)
Moondo_; 1,500
Mooncat 774
Module 2 - FY02
ELEMENT LAUNCHER COSTS ($M)
Misc. Equipment
Utility Room 2 + Water
Airlock + Air
Moonbird
Mooncat
Moonbird
610
730
614
Module 3 - FY03
ELEMENT LAUNCHER COSTS ($M)
Passageway/Loader Moonbird 631
Airlock + Air Moonbird 614
Passa[ewaflLoader
Airlock + Air
Moonbird
Moonbird
606
631
Module 4 - FY04
ELEMENT LAUNCHER COSTS ($Mi
Bathroom/Shower
Main Entr_,
Moondo_
Mooncat
1,320
759
Module 5 - FY05
ELEMENT LAUNCHER COSTS ($M)
Biomed Facility
Airlock + MRE
Moondo_
Moonbird
1,380
614
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Table B-2. Lunar basepacing(continued).
Module 6 FY06
ELEMENT
Livin_ Quarters
Storm Mesh + Misc.
Equipment
LAUNCHER
Moondog
Moonbird
COSTS ($M)
1,340
ELEMENT LAUNCHER COSTS ($M)
7 I I mii iil
610
MANNED MISSION #1 Moondog 6, 000
Module 7- FY07
ELEMENT LAUNCHER COSTS (M)
Airlock + MRE Moonbird 614
Suit Room Moondo[ 1,350
im i| i
Module 8 - FY08
ELEMENT LAUNCHER COSTS ($M)
Maintenance Facility
Miscellaneous Equipment
Moondo_ 1,380
Moonbird 610
Module 9 - FY09
ELEMENT LAUNCHER COSTS ($M)
Laboratory 2
Utility' Room 1 + Water
Moondog ....... 1,370
Mooncat 730
L
Module 10- FYIO
ELEMENT LAUNCHER COSTS ($M)
Conference Room/Offices Moondog 1,336
Airlock + Air Moonbird 614
Module 11 - FYl l
ELEMENT LAUNCHER COSTS ($M)
, ,, ,,,,
Airlock Moonbird 614
.Dining/Bar Facility, Moondog 1,344
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TableB-2. Lunar basepacing(continued).
Module 12 - FY12
ELEMENT
Passageway + Water
Passageway + Water
Passageway + Water
LAUNCHER COSTS ($M)
Moonbird 606
Moonbird 606
Moonbird 606
ELEMENT LAUNCHER COSTS ($M)
MANNED MISSION #2 Moondog 6,000
Module 13 - FY13
ELEMENT LAUNCHER COSTS ($M)
Observatory Moondog 1,800
Module 14 - FY14
ELEMENT LAUNCHER COSTS ($M)
Library
Secondary Entrance
Moondog 1,320
Moonbird 614
Module 15 - FY15
ELEMENT LAUNCHER COSTS ($M)
Mooncat 790
Mooncat 766
Secondar_ Suit Room
Exercise Facility
Miscellaneous Equipment Moonbird 610
Module 16- FY16
ELEMENT LAUNCHER COSTS ($M)
Airlock Moonbird 614
Lab 1 Moondog 1,370
Module 17 - FY17
ELEMENT LAUNCHER COSTS ($M)
Lab 3
Airlock
Moondo_
Moonbird
1,370
614
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TableB-2. Lunar basepacing(continued).
Module 18 - FY18
ELEMENT LAUNCHER COSTS ($M)
Passageway Moonbird 606
Greenhouse Moondog 1,310
Module 19 - FY19
ELEMENT LAUNCHER COSTS ($M)
Fuel Cell Module M0ondo_;
Miscellaneous Equip. Moonbird
1,500
610
ELEMENT
MANNED MISSION #3
LAUNCHER COSTS ($M)
Moondog _000
Module 20- FY20
ELEMENT LAUNCHER COSTS ($M)
Oxygen Plant Moondo_ 3,000
Module 21 - FY21
ELEMENT LAUNCHER COSTS ($M)
r
Airbanks Mo0ndo _ 1,320
_Miscellaneous Equipment Moonbird 610
Module 22 - FY22
ELEMENT LAUNCHER COSTS ($M)
Extra Solar Power Grid
Miscellaneous Equipment .
ELEMENT
Moondo_
Moonbkd
LAUNCHER
1,500
610
COSTS ($M)
MANNED MISSION #4 Moonbeast 6,000
ELEMENT- LAUNCHER COSTS ($M)
Steady State - FY23
Steady State - FY24
Steady State - FY25
Moonbeast 3,000
Moonbeast 3,000
Moonbeast 3,000
And so forth...
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Table B-3. Total cost of program.
TYPE COST
Launch Services
Launch Vehicles
Modules/Stron_backs
Administration/Overhead
Contingencies/Inflation
Other
TOTALS
TOTAL COST ($M)
1,000
17,500
16,722
10,000
10,000
20,000
$75,222
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APPENDIX C
THE TRANSPORTATION ANALOG
The United States South Pole Station is serviced through the use of United States Navy and
Air Force aircraft, with some slight supplement by other Government and private aircraft. The Navy
and Air Force are then reimbursed by the NSF for this service. It is suggested that the rather
massive movement of modules, infrastructure, and expendables to the lunar base be handled in the
same way---essentially a subcontract to a separate entity for the transportation--an entity which
has experience in space transportation. This entity can be either NASA, the Air Force, or a consor-
tium of aerospace contractors. It should, in any case, be one of the above and not a mixture of all
three. It should be the goal of this program to reduce overhead and administrative costs. Having a
wide consortium of agencies and nongovernmental institutions trying to operate any project has
always been inefficient. The LTU should subcontract to the most efficient agency or consortium and
stick with it as long as it is a mutually beneficial relationship.
As of now, the principle aircraft used to support the South Pole Station is the C-130 aircraft, a
turboprop cargo carrier which has been in service since the early 1960's. It is an efficient carrier for
which there is a wide understanding of maintenance and service procedures, plus an inventory of
repair and replacement parts. The C-130 exists, however, for many other uses other than resupply
and construction of the South Pole Station. That is why it is a cost-effective aircraft to use. It is
similarly suggested that the lunar base use space boosters already in the inventory for construction
and resupply. This is an important point. No funds should be expended to build a new booster. It
simply would drive up the costs of the program. II is suggested, however, that over the 22-year
period of the program, eventually new technology will create a more efficient heavy-lift booster that
will be available to the lunar base. This would probably not happen until the latter phases of lunar
base construction.
The launch vehicles to be used for the construction and resupply of the lunar base is shown in
table C-1. For simplification, they are referred to as a stable of easily recognizable names: Moondog
(the shuttle plus Titan IV and Centaur), Mooncat (Titan IV and Centaur), and Moonbird (Atlas and
Centaur).
Table C-2 lists the number of launcher types that will be required over the entire quarter-
century of construction of the lunar base. It is also recommended, as shown in this table, that the
route to the Moon for the transportation of the various unmanned modules of the lunar base be the
"fuzzy boundary" route to the Moon rather than the classic Hohmann transfer route. The fuzzy
boundary route, shown in figure C-1, was First outlined by mathematicians Edward Belbruno and
Jaume Llibre (please see bibliography) as a breakthrough calculation of orbits and trajectories that
greatly reduces the amount of fuel needed to get to the other planets. The fuzzy boundary is the
region where the effects of both Sun and Earth gravity are nearly the same. A spacecraft that flies to
this boundary (usually using the Moon for a gravity assist on the way) can be nudged back to the
Moon and into orbit without the expenditure of propellant required for braking. This means a large
savings in the weight of the spacecraft. The only drawback to the fuzzy boundary route is that it
requires more time to get to the Moon than the classic route. The Hohmann transfer requires only
about 3 days to get to the Moon. The fuzzy boundary route will require several weeks or even
months. For the construction of the lunar base, however, the lag in time to the Moon should be no
problem for the unmanned modules.
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Table C-3 lists the strongback/landers required to place the various construction components
on the lunar surface including a suggested cost for each. These strongback/landers would require a
"new start" design and construction but could borrow heavily from the Apollo lunar module and lunar
rover experience.
Figures C-2 and C-3 are illustrative of the various launcher combinations recommended and
the number of launches required for each over the quarter-century of lunar base construction. Figure
C-4 illustrates the "Moonbeast" heavy launcher that might be designed and built for many purposes
besides the lunar base during the first part of the 21st century. The Moonbeast would be a very effi-
cient booster and would be designed to be cost effective. The LTU would, of course, seek to use it.
Table C-1. Launcher combinations.
(Note: Launch costs and payload weights based on estimates as presented in Launch Options of the
Future, 1988, Congress of the United States and other resources)
..... Launch Vehic!e(s)
Moondog - (STS rendezvous with Titan IV/Centaur)
Mooncat - (Titan IV/Centaur)
Moonbird - (Atlas/Centaur)
Payload to Moon
(kg)
22,000
10,000
5,000
Cost of Launch
($M)
8O0
350
250
Table C-2. Launcher requirements for complete lunar base.
Launch Vehicle(s)
Moondog
Mooncat
Moonb_d
Payload
Heavy
Medium
Light
Quantity Required
14
8
14
Table C-3. Lunar base strongback/lander requirements.
Element
Hab/Lab
Specialty
Airlocks, etc.
Total Launches
Type Lander
Heavy (10-20,000 k_)
Medium(5-10,000 kg)
Low (< 5,000 kg)
Quantity
Required
14
8
14
35
Cost
($M)
11,200
2,800
3,500
$17,500
i
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Thrustor
boost to escape
velocity .-_
Lunar orbit --_
IMoon
Entry into
Lunar orbit
wilh no retro-
rocket firing
required
_F_by of Moon
for gravity assist
Figure C-1. Fuzzy boundary route to the Moon.
Trajectory of
Lunar base
cargo flights
FY01 F¥02 Fyr04 FY00 FY15
MOONCAT MEDIUM PAYLOAD LAUNCHES
REQUIRED FOR FULL LUNAR BASE
FY02 F'Y02 FY03 FY03 FY03 FY03 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY10 FY11 F'Y12 FY12 FY12 FY14 FY15 FY16
l lll
FY17 FY18 FYlg FY21 FY2;
MOONBIRD LIGHT PAYLOAD LAUNCHES
REQUIRED FOR FULL LUNAR BASE
L'--ATLAS/CENTAUR
Figure C-2. Medium and light launchers required for lunar base.
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FY10
FY11 FY12 - FY13 FY14 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19
MANNED
................... SHUTTLE/'rlTAN IV
_ COMBINATION - RENDEZVOUS IN LEO
FY19 - FY20 FY21 FY22
MANNED
Figure C-3. Heavy launchers required for full lunar base.
.....
I
FY23 FY24 FY25
,, MOONBEAST
Figure C-4. Extra-heavy launchers needed for steady-state operation of lunar base.
APPENDIX D
ANNUAL EXPENDABLES REQUIREMENT
FOR A LUNAR BASE AND A 6-PERSON STAFF
(based on United States Army Field Manual 5-34)
Requirement Per Person Annual Req.
Per Day
We_ht(_)
Potable Water 5 gallons 10,950 gal. 91,376
Non-potable Water 4 gallons 8,760 gal. 73,058
Food 4 MRE * 8,760 MRE 17,250
Air 2.3 lbs. 4,035 lbs. 4,035
* Meals Ready to Eat
Initial Cargo:
Water = 13,702 lb (enough for one month, unrecycled)
Air = 336 lb (enough for one month, unrecycled)
Assumed Loss Rates:
Water = 20 percent annually
Air = 50 percent annually
Annual Cargo Requirements:
Water = 2,740 lb
Food = 17,250 Ib
Air = 168 lb
Total = 20,428 lb or 9.285 kg.
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APPENDIX E
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR
THE NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION
FACILITIES:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Questionnaire
Relating to the National Science Foundation
South Pole Station
Provide a general layout of the South Pole Station.
Provide interior layouts of each facility, use of each area, and square feet available in each area.
How were the interior layouts determined?
How as the general architecture of the station determined and designed?
What materials were used in the construction of each facility?
What were the design specificiations of the facility? Strengh of materials, insulation, etc.?
How long did it take to construct each facility? How many workers used? What equipment was
used?
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Questionnaire
Relating to the National Science Foundation
South Pole Station
ENERGY:
° How is electrical power provided to the station? What is the cost of the power plant(s), how
much does it weigh, is there any special handling required, special construction, materials?
2. What is the generated capacity of the main power plant? Auxiliary and back-up plants?
3. How much electric cabling is required? What size? What weight? Is it strung overhead or
underground? How was that done?
4. What is the recorded energy demand of the station? Does it very by season? Can the energy
demand be broken out by area of use?
5. What kind of electricity is provided? AC or DC? 110 or 220? 60 cycles? Etc.?
6. Are there other forms of energy provided? Gas heat?
28
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COMMUNICATIONS:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Questionnaire
Relating to the National Science Foundation
South Pole Station
How are communications to the outside provided at the station? Are there backups?
What kind of communications are required?
How much traffic is logged?
How often are crew members allowed to communicate with friends and family? Are
communications private?
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Questionnaire
Relating to the National Science Foundation
South Pole Station
MAINTENANCE:
1. How are facilities maintained? Is there a schedule for this maintenance? Who does it and how
often?
2. How are the power plants maintained? Is there a schedule for this maintenance? Who does it and
how often?
3. Does each crew person clean their own space or are housekeeping duties rotated in some way?
4. Is there a log of necessary repairs on the facility and power plants over and above routine
mainenance?
3O
FOOD:
1.
2.
3.
4.
.
6.
7.
8.
Questionnaire
Relating to the National Science Foundation
South Pole Station
What quantity of food is required to support the station during the average month?
What kind and quantity of each kind of food is required during the average month?
How is the type of food determined?
What support equipment is required for food handling and preparation? Refrigerators? Stoves?
Utensils? Dinnerware?
How is waste food disposed?
How much food spoils during the average month?
Who does the food preparation?
How are meals handled--family style, cafeteria style, pre-packaged, self-prepared?
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Questionnaire
Relating to the National Science Foundation
South Pole Station
WATER:
1. How much water is required per person per week in the station?
2. How is the water used?
3. Breakout of water use (per person)?
a. Personal hygiene
b. Cooking
c. Laundry
d. Sewage
e. Drinking
£ Facility/Equipment cleaning
g. Other
4. How is the water obtained? Is any of it recycled?How is it recycled?
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Questionnaire
Relating to the National Science Foundation
South Pole Station
HEALTH AND HYGIENE:
1. How is the health of the crew supported? What kind of medical staff7
2. Are the crews given special medical training?
3. What medical supplies are kept on hand? How long is this amount intended to support how
many personnel?
4. What medical care facilities are provided?
5. What medical equipment?
6. Is there a problem with fungal infections?
7. What medical emergencies have occurred during "wintering over" periods?
8. Do the crews participate in an exercise program? What kind of exercise equipment?
9. Is odor control required? What kind of odors accumulate?
10. What special hygiene efforts are required?
11. Is sound control a problem? Are there "good" or "bad" sounds?
12. What hygiene is required? How is this supervised?
13. How often do crews change clothes? Any facilities for washing clothes?
14. Is alcohol permitted during "wintering over" periods?
15. What is the policy regarding the use of medicinal drugs?
16. Are there psychological problems? What kind? Any recurring ones? How are these handled?
17. Do long periods of isolation cause problems between crew members?
18. Is any psychological/personality screening done prior to assignment? Is there any further
psychological support given to the crews?
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Questionnaire
Relating to the National Science Foundation
South Pole Station
TRAINING:
1. How are crews selected and trained?
2. Are there any areas that require special training?
3. Are crews given any training in group communications and teamwork before wintering over?
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Questionnaire
Relating to the National Science Foundation
South Pole Station
SCHEDULES:
1. What are the work schedules and supervision required? Do crews work in shifts? On their own?
Other plans?
2. What other schedules are maintained? Who determines them?
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Questionnaire
Relating to the National Science Foundation
South Pole Station
RECREATION:
1. What recreation is provided the crews?
2. What recreation seems the best?
3. How much recreation seems to be best?
4. Do all crew members seem to need the same amount of recreation?
36
z
z
z
IF
=
Questionnaire
Relating to the National Science Foundation
South Pole Station
CREW CONSIDERATIONS:
1. How is personal time handled? Scheduled?
2. What is the cultural/gender mix of crews? Any problems?
3. Is there any adjustment period for crews after they arrive?
4. Is there any re-adjustment time needed when crews go home?
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Questionnaire
Relating to the National Science Foundation
South Pole Station
WORK/SCIENCE PERFORMED:
1. What generic science equipment and supplies are at the station? How were these determined?
Weight and quantity of this equipment?
2. To what extent do the expedition members control the experiments? Are they more like mission
specialists or more like principal investigators?
38
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Questionnaire
Relating to the National Science Foundation
South Pole Station
OUTSIDE OPERATIONS:
1. How often do the crews go out on the ice? Why do they go out?
2. What kind of outside transportation is provided?
3. How far do they go from the base? What is the procedure if a crewman is lost?
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APPENDIX F
NSF SOUTH POLE STATION INFORMATION
AVAILABLE FROM THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES, WASHINGTON DC
Central file:
Number
105.10
105.10a
105.13
105.13.1
105.13.2
105.13.5
RG307 National Science Foundation
Office of Antarctic Programs
(OAP) Central Subject K.6S
South Pole Station
Boxes Title
77 South Pole Station (Gen.) incl. plans for facilities
77 South Pole St. replacement facility '65-'69
80 Pole Station (1959-64)
Replacement of Pole Station (Bureau of Yards and Docks)
Pole Station Inventory, 1958-62
Pole Station Photos and Sketches
Contact: Marjorie Ciarlante
Civil Reference Branch
National Archives
Phone: 202-501-5395
\
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